This study identifies common perceptions between Thomas Hobbes’ approach to religion with that of Critias the sophist. Despite the distance that separates the social environments within which each of these authors lived and wrote, in their political philosophy we can spot a shared set of concerns, whose importance transcend the historical and political contexts in which the authors lived and wrote: in the state of nature, where no organized commonwealth (or civil society) exists, capable of repressing the innate greed of men and women, savagery and conflict reign supreme; life is threatened by violence and extreme aggression. It is only the state of society that guarantees stability and good life. For both thinkers, belief in immaterial spirits protects the state of society; belief in God promotes obedience to civil law and guarantees human co-existence. In Critias’ mind, religion is a necessary means to avert aggression, even when the State’s executive powers are unable to punish offenders, using all necessary tools to prevent hostility and conflict. While civil law is the hallmark of peace and stability, belief in a transcendent entity that influences collective and individual modes of living, is an important addition to the pursuit of social peace. A few centuries later, Hobbes (influenced by the misery of the English Civil War) developed viewpoints that also highlight the role of religion in defending social peace. Nonetheless, in Hobbes’ mind religion could safeguard stability only (A) when ecclesiastical authorities submit to the judgment of an omnipotent Sovereign and (B) when the coercive mechanisms of the State supress religious pluralism, prohibiting different interpretations of the Bible, which Hobbes himself considered one of the main causes of conflict.
Tag: Hobbes
The Byzantine cosmopolis beyond western liberalism
The present article reflects on Early Byzantine strands of political thought (more precisely, on viewpoints developed by Priscus of Panion and Procopius of Caesarea) in tandem with Anthony Kaldellis’ depiction of Byzantium as a representative politeia. It explains how Priscus’ and Procopius’ insights concerning the Eastern Roman Empire as lawful polity could allow us to envisage a new cosmopolitan paradigm, grounded on ‘bottom-up’ institutions of political representation. This paradigm could respond to a series of limitations that characterise the present standards of international cooperation, upon which transnational projects, such as the European Union, are predicated. These standards rely much on Immanuel Kant’s viewpoints on cosmopolitanism, but also on John Locke’s theory of Social Contract, which constitutes a genealogical evolution of Hobbes’ absolutist thought that I also intend to submit to scrutiny. In short, I set out to explain how this new cosmopolitan paradigm (based on this particular depiction of Byzantium as a ‘representative’ and ‘lawful constitution’) could respond to gaps identified in the liberal canon of international relations.